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“Merely denouncing sexism in sentencing without examining the 
effect of so-called gender-neutral sentencing ultimately operates to 
the detriment of women whose lives are shaped by the existing gender 
social structure.”1 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past 40 years, the entire United States penal population 
has grown at an unprecedented rate, and the rate of female 
incarceration is growing at twice the rate of men.2  Given that there 
does not appear to be an increase in female criminality that 
corresponds with the increase in female incarceration, it may be 
inferred that the rising rate of female imprisonment is the result of 
changes in criminal justice law and policy that “prescribe simplistic, 
punitive enforcement responses to complex social problems.”3 
While criminological research has paid increased attention to 
women and girls over the past decade, there is still much work left to 
be done.  This Note aims to address a perceived gap in existing 
scholarship on female incarceration — existing research and proposed 
 
 1. Myrna S. Raeder, Gender and Sentencing: Single Moms, Battered Women, 
and Other Sex-Based Anomalies in the Gender-Free World of the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, 20 PEPP. L. REV. 905, 921 (1993). 
 2. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS 1 (2018), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/incarcerated-women-and-girls/ 
[https://perma.cc/2EWA-YGAA]. 
 3. Stephanie S. Covington & Barbara E. Bloom, Gendered Justice: Women in 
the Criminal Justice System, in GENDERED JUSTICE: ADDRESSING FEMALE 
OFFENDERS 1, 1–2 (Barbara E. Bloom ed., 2003). 
Nationally, the number of women in state and federal prisons increased 
nearly eightfold between 1980 and 2001, from 12,300 to 93,031 . . . . Despite 
these figures, there does not appear to be a corresponding increase in 
women’s criminality. In 1998, nearly two-thirds of women in state prisons 
were serving sentences for nonviolent offenses . . . . Women are arrested 
and incarcerated primarily for property and drug offenses, with drug 
offenses representing the largest source of the increase (36%) in the number 
of women prisoners in 1998.  Interestingly, the proportion of women 
imprisoned for violent crimes has continued to decrease. The rate at which 
women commit murder has been declining since 1980, and the per capita 
rate of murders committed by women in 1998 was the lowest recorded since 
1976. Of the women in state prisons in 1998, 28 percent had been 
incarcerated for a violent offense[.] 
Id. at 1. 
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solutions have tended to focus on prison conditions and post-
incarceration re-entry.  While such work is imperative, an 
examination of the female pathways to incarceration is equally 
important.  This Note argues reforms that target the front end of the 
incarceration process, namely sentencing, should be employed to 
address the rapidly rising rate of female incarceration. 
Prior to 1970, the United States followed an indeterminate 
sentencing model, under which multiple actors in the criminal justice 
system had broad discretion in imposing sentences for individual 
offenders.  In the 1970s, however, as crime rates began to rise, many 
attacked the indeterminate model for its allegedly inconsistent 
results.4  In response, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act of 
1984 (SRA), which authorized the creation of the Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines.5  Sentencing inconsistencies, particularly across gender 
and race, were a key area of concern for critics of indeterminate 
sentencing.6  Notably, the text and the legislative history of the SRA 
both reveal “Congress’s concern with outcome inequality under the 
prior indeterminate system and the explicit search for greater 
sentencing equality through sentencing reform.”7  The intention 
behind adopting the determinate sentencing model, therefore, was to 
move away from indeterminacy’s resulting formal outcome 
inequality, where “[d]ifferent sentences for similar offenses 
responded to the circumstances and characteristics of each offender.”8 
Yet, while the Federal Sentencing Guidelines were “designed to 
reduce race, class, and other unwarranted disparities in sentencing,” 
many criminologists credit the expansion in the female prison 
population to the adoption of determinate sentencing structures at 
both the state and federal level, which brought with it gender-blind 
mandatory sentencing statutes and the “corresponding ‘equalization’ 
of justice.”9  These findings raise questions as to the true 
consequences of formal equality in sentencing for female offenders.10 
 
 4. See John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following 
Blakely: The Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. REV. 235, 241 
(2006). 
 5. Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984). 
 6. See Pfaff, supra note 4, at 241 (noting there was a “growing concern that, 
either consciously or unconsciously, judges were taking into account impermissible 
factors such as defendants’ race and sex when meting out punishments”). 
 7. Marc L. Miller, Sentencing Equality Pathology, 54 EMORY L.J. 271, 273 
(2005). 
 8. Id. at 272. 
 9. Stephanie Bontrager et al., Gender and Sentencing: A Meta-Analysis of 
Contemporary Research, 16 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 349, 363 (2013); see also 
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Part I of this Note first provides a brief overview of the mass 
incarceration crisis in America and the changes in criminal justice 
policy, namely sentencing policy, to which it is attributed.  Part I then 
discusses the impact of changes in sentencing policy on female 
sentencing outcomes.  Part II proposes a framework of inquiry to be 
used by policymakers engaged in the creation of gender-responsive 
sentencing policies.  This framework includes an analysis of the scope 
and nature of female incarceration, the correlates of female 
criminality, and the impact of existing gender-neutral policies on 
women involved in the criminal justice system.  Finally, Part III 
discusses the efficacy of gender-neutral sentencing policies in action 
and identifies two policies that exemplify proper application of the 
framework presented in Part II. 
I. MASS INCARCERATION, SENTENCING REFORM, AND WHAT IT 
ALL MEANS FOR WOMEN IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 
Although efforts have been made to reduce the size of the 
incarcerated population — particularly state prison populations — 
such efforts have been more effective for men than for women.11  The 
gamut of policy areas that must be addressed to accomplish true 
reform are too vast for any one discussion.  By necessity, therefore, 
this Note specifically addresses only sentencing policy.12  To that end, 
this Part discusses the recent history of sentencing policy reforms in 
America within the context of the mass incarceration crisis and the 
impact of such reforms on women involved in the criminal justice 
system. 
 
Covington & Bloom, supra note 3, at 4 (“[T]he current model of justice — called the 
‘equalization’ approach — emphasizes parity and then utilizes a male standard. 
Therefore, increased incarceration of women takes the place of alternatives to 
prison.”). 
 10. See Barbara A. Koons-Witt, The Effect of Gender on the Decision to 
Incarcerate Before and After the Introduction of Sentencing Guidelines, 40 
CRIMINOLOGY 297, 301–02 (2002) (“[S]entencing guidelines may have had 
unintended consequences and undesirable effects as well, notably, an increase in the 
likelihood of incarceration for women, including nonviolent offenders.”). 
 11. See WENDY SAWYER, PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE, THE GENDER DIVIDE: 
TRACKING WOMEN’S STATE PRISON GROWTH PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (2018), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/women_overtime.html [https://perma.cc/UQ6K-
58K3] (“The total number of men incarcerated in state prisons fell more than 5% 
between 2009 and 2015, while the number of women in state prisons fell only a 
fraction of a percent (0.29%.”). 
 12. This Note focuses specifically on sentencing because changes in sentencing 
policy have been found to have particularly clear gendered consequences. See, e.g., 
Covington & Bloom, supra note 3, at 5–6. 
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A. The Rise of Mass Incarceration in America 
While an in-depth discussion of mass incarceration is beyond the 
scope of this Note, a cursory examination of the mass incarceration 
crisis in the United States is critical to understanding the context 
within which the current state of female incarceration arises.  This 
Section begins, therefore, by presenting empirical data that quantifies 
the mass incarceration crisis, and then introduces the changes in 
criminal justice policy, namely sentencing policy, that have caused it. 
The magnitude of incarceration in a society is typically measured 
by the incarceration rate, shown as a ratio of those people in prison 
and jail as compared to the general population at a given moment in 
time.13  Depending on the goals of the measurement, the rate of 
incarceration can be calculated for specific geographic areas, ranging 
from a neighborhood to an entire state, and for specific 
demographics, including race, age, and gender.14 
For purposes of calculating the rate of incarceration in the United 
States, the incarcerated population includes those who are confined in 
federal prison, state prison, and jail.15  People who are confined in 
federal prisons run by the United States Bureau of Prisons have been 
sentenced for federal crimes, primarily those federal crimes which 
involve “robbery, fraud, drugs, weapons and immigration.”16  State 
prisons run by individual State Departments of Corrections primarily 
confine those who are serving time for felony convictions or those 
who are incarcerated for violating the terms of their parole.17  Local 
jails generally confine people who are convicted of misdemeanor 
crimes, have received sentences of less than one year, or are awaiting 
trial and have not paid or are ineligible for bail.18 
Prior to 1970, the rate of incarceration in the United States had 
remained relatively constant for 50 years.19  In 1972, however, the 
incarceration rate began to grow rapidly and continued to increase 
 
 13. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE GROWTH OF INCARCERATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES: EXPLORING CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 19, 64 (Jeremy Travis et al. eds., 
2014), https://www.nap.edu/catalog/18613/the-growth-of-incarceration-in-the-united-
states-exploring-causes [https://perma.cc/Z97H-MPB8]. 
 14. See id. 
 15. See id. at 37. 
 16. Id. at 38. 
 17. Id. at 38. (“The state prison population can be broadly divided into three 
offense categories: violent offenses (including murder, rape, and robbery), property 
offenses (primarily auto vehicle theft, burglary, and larceny/theft), and drug offenses 
(manufacturing, possession, and sale).”). 
 18. Id. at 40. 
 19. See id. at 33. 
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annually by 6% to 8% through 2008, at which point it plateaued at an 
all-time high.20  In absolute numbers, the American penal population 
increased by almost two million people in 40 years.21  By the end of 
2016, there were over 6.6 million people under the control of the 
United States correctional systems, including those held in jails and 
prisons as well as those on probation and parole.22  Comparatively 
speaking, the rate of incarceration in the United States is substantially 
higher than any other country: for example, in 2009, the incarcerated 
population in the United States constituted approximately 23% of the 
total number of people incarcerated worldwide.23 
Observers have identified a shift in our conception of the nature of 
criminal punishment, and the resulting changes in law and policy 
concerning sentencing, as a “likely culprit” behind mass 
incarceration.24  In the United States, the 1960s were filled with a 
“complex combination of organized protests, urban riots, violent 
crime and drug use, [and] the collapse of urban school,” and 
economic opportunities for many Americans began to decline.25  In 
the 1970s, technological advancements and globalization led to mass 
layoffs and factory closings in the industrial sector.26  Then, 
throughout the 1980s, employment among young Americans 
continued to fall, and “a wave of crack cocaine use and related street 
crime hit many of the nation’s already distressed inner cities.”27 
The socioeconomic turmoil and rising crime rates of the 1960s, 
1970s, and 1980s contributed to “public fears of crime and support for 
tougher sanctions” which, in turn, led to a shift in federal and state-
level criminal justice policy, including major changes in the 
categorization of crime and the severity of criminal punishments.28  
This shift has manifested in the adoption of sentencing laws and 
guidelines “providing for lengthy prison sentences for drug and 
 
 20. Id. at 34. In 1972, for every 100,000 U.S. residents, 161 were incarcerated in 
prisons and jails. Id. at 33. By 2012, 707 people were incarcerated for every 100,000, 
and the rate of incarceration in America was the highest in the world. Id. at 33–34. 
 21. See id. at 36. 
 22. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES, 2016 (2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=pbdetail&iid=6226 [https://perma.cc/Q3Z9-83BW]. 
 23. See NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 36–37. 
 24. See JONATHAN SIMON, MASS INCARCERATION: FROM SOCIAL POLICY TO 
SOCIAL PROBLEM 13, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND 
CORRECTIONS (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012). 
 25. Id. at 24. 
 26. Id. at 25. 
 27. Id. at 25. 
 28. Id. at 25. 
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violent crimes and repeat offenses, and the enactment in more than 
half the states and in the federal system of three strikes and truth-in-
sentencing laws” in almost every state system and in the federal 
system.29  These laws and guidelines have been identified as a primary 
cause of mass incarceration.30 
B. A Brief History of Modern Sentencing Reform 
Following World War II, the “penological arena was permeated by 
a general rehabilitative thrust,” prompted by the relative prosperity, 
low crime rates, and optimism of the 1950s.31  The shift to a 
rehabilitative approach is also credited to a 1965 survey compiled for 
the President’s Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration 
of Justice, which found the “brutal and degrading” prison conditions 
in which offenders lived were “the poorest possible preparation for 
their successful reentry into society, and often merely reinforce in 
them a pattern of manipulation or destructiveness.”32  In response, 
the American penal system moved away from the belief that 
imprisonment is the most effective means of deterring crime towards 
a treatment-focused anti-institutional model that attempted to avoid 
incarceration “by keeping offenders in the community and helping 
them, through various programs, to reintegrate.”33 
A key expression of the treatment-focused model was the 
widespread adoption of the indeterminate sentencing structure.34  
The indeterminate approach was grounded upon the assumption that 
 
 29. Id. at 70. 
 30. Id. at 70. 
 31. Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 248 (1949) (“Retribution is no longer the 
dominant objective of the criminal law. Reformation and rehabilitation of offenders 
have become important goals of criminal jurisprudence.”); PHILIP GOODMAN ET AL., 
BREAKING THE PENDULUM 78 (2017) (in describing the rehabilitative ideal, renowned 
legal scholar Francis Allen explained, “it is assumed that measures employed to treat 
the convicted offender should serve a therapeutic function, that such measures should 
be designed to effect changes in the behavior of the convicted person in the interests 
of his own happiness, health, and satisfactions and in the interests of social defense”); 
Edgardo Rotman, The Failure of Reform: United States, 1865–1965, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 169, 
189 (1995) (“The generalized conclusion that prison unrest was the result of 
insufficient rehabilitative programs led, however, to an intensification of the 
therapeutic thrust in prisons after the early 1950s spate of prison riots.”). 
 32. Rotman, supra note 31, at 193. 
 33. Id. at 194–95. 
 34. See SANDRA SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, SENTENCING 
REFORM IN THE UNITED STATES: HISTORY, CONTENT, AND EFFECT 6 (1985) (“By the 
1960’s, every state of the nation had an indeterminate sentencing structure or some 
variation.”). 
402 FORDHAM URB. L.J. [Vol. XLVII 
“the offender suffered from some physical, psychological, or social-
environmental affliction.”35  Under this system, the legislature 
established maximum, but rarely minimum, sentences.36  In individual 
cases, judges were granted substantial discretion to impose any 
sentence below the maximum.37  While a judicially imposed sentence 
established the maximum number of years that an individual would 
be incarcerated, the actual term that the individual would serve was 
later decided by a parole board based on “the gravity of the crime, 
the prisoner’s behavior in prison, and the parole board’s prediction of 
his likely success during the parole release term.”38 
At the height of the indeterminate sentencing regime, it has been 
estimated that people who were incarcerated served between one-
third and two-thirds of the judicially imposed sentence in prison.  The 
remaining unserved time, or the difference between the maximum 
sentence set by the judge and the time actually spent in prison, was 
served under conditional release.39  Sentencing was thus said to be 
indeterminate because “the lengths of prison sentences could not be 
determined at sentencing.  They became known in individual cases 
only when the last of the judicial, correctional, and parole board 
decisions was made.”40 
i. The Fall of the Indeterminate Sentencing Model 
In the late 1960s, the indeterminate approach was attacked on 
multiple fronts.41  From a socio-political perspective, rising rates of 
serious crime in the 1960s and 1970s fueled the public’s call for 
sentencing reform and intensified mounting political pressure to 
move away from the “assumed leniency” of the indeterminate model 
toward a model premised on equal treatment.42  Some critics focused 
primarily on issues of equality and argued sentences were too 
 
 35. Id. 
 36. Norval Morris, The Contemporary Prison: 1965–Present, in THE OXFORD 
HISTORY OF THE PRISON: THE PRACTICE OF PUNISHMENT IN WESTERN SOCIETY 227, 
242 (1998). 
 37. Sentencing Reform, in SENTENCING REFORM IN OVERCROWDED TIMES: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 6 (Michael Tonry & Kathleen Hatlestad eds., 1997). 
 38. Morris, supra note 36, at 242. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Sentencing Reform, supra note 37, at 6. 
 41. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Lawlessness in Sentencing, 41 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 
1 (1972) (“The ‘phase’ of our system thus characterized is by and large a bizarre 
‘nonsystem’ of extravagant powers confided to variable and essentially unregulated 
judges, keepers and parole officials.”). 
 42. See Morris, supra note 36, at 243. 
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arbitrary, as evidenced by the fact that “[s]imilarly situated 
defendants could receive dramatically difference sentences based on 
which judge each faced or what day each appeared before a given 
judge.”43  Such criticisms focused on the indeterminate model’s 
embrace of formal outcome inequality, where “[d]ifferent sentences 
for similar offenses responded to the circumstances and 
characteristics of each offender.”44 
According to this line of argument, because the indeterminate 
model incorrectly assumes that “crime is the product of individual 
pathology,” it thus requires actors in the criminal justice system to 
make highly subjective assessments of individual pathology in 
sentencing.45  The discretionary exercise of power by those making 
such subjective assessments, therefore, “had contributed to the 
development and continuation of a dual system of justice which was 
unfair to the poor, non-white, and the politically weak.”46 
Many critics further cited to rising rates of serious crime, arguing 
that indeterminate sentences undermined the “deterrent power” of 
the law.47  The theory of deterrence is premised on the assertion that, 
in deciding whether to engage in criminal behavior, a would-be 
offender balances costs — including probability of arrest, probability 
of conviction, and severity of the sanction likely to be imposed — 
against potential benefits.48  If the costs outweigh the benefits, 
criminal activity will be discouraged.49  Indeterminate sentencing, 
these critics assert, undermines the deterrent power of the criminal 
sanctions by creating inconsistencies across sentences for similar 
 
 43. Pfaff, supra note 4, at 241. 
 44. Miller, supra note 7, at 272. 
 45. SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., supra note 34, at 7–8. This was based on American 
Friends Service Committee’s Struggle for Justice: A Report on Crime and 
Punishment in America (1971): 
The final report of the group specifically criticized the indeterminate 
sentencing structure for its assumption that: 1) crime is the product of 
individual pathology; 2) penology has the knowledge to affect treatment of 
criminal; 3) experts have established a sufficient body of knowledge to 
diagnose the particular factors resulting in criminal activity; 4) knowledge 
for practice in criminology is free from biases of race, class, or status; 5) 
useful and accurate means of measuring the success of treatment exists; and 
finally that 6) discretionary power is a necessary attribute of a fair and 
efficient criminal justice system. 
Id. 
 46. Id. at 8. 
 47. Pfaff, supra note 4, at 241. 
 48. See Daniel S. Nagin, Deterrence in the Twenty-First Century, 42 CRIME & 
JUST. 199, 206–08 (2013). 
 49. Id. at 206. 
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crimes.50  In balancing the costs and benefits of criminal behavior, 
therefore, would-be criminal offenders are unable to properly account 
for the severity of the punishment that is likely to be imposed for a 
given criminal act. 
ii. The Adoption of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
After nearly a decade of debate, Congress passed the Sentencing 
Reform Act (SRA) in 1984, which authorized the formation of the 
U.S. Sentencing Commission and, by extension, the creation of the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.51  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
are “a system of multiple recommended sentences and dispositions”52 
designed to guide judicial decisions by requiring the sentencing judge 
to “assign numerical weight to numerous aggravating and mitigating 
factors” relating to the offender’s criminal conduct criminal history.53  
With the introduction of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, the 
perceived purpose of criminal punishment shifted away from 
rehabilitation toward deterrence, and the focus of sentencing “away 
from the personal characteristics of the offender to the circumstances 
of the offense.”54 
iii. State-Level Adoption of the Determinate Model 
Prior to the introduction of determinate sentencing, every state had 
an indeterminate sentencing system.55  The federal sentencing reform 
 
 50. Pfaff, supra note 4, at 241. 
 51. See The Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (1984); see also Ilene H. 
Nagel & Barry L. Johnson, The Role of Gender in a Structured Sentencing System: 
Equal Treatment, Policy Choices, and the Sentencing of Female Offenders Under the 
United States Sentencing Guidelines, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 181, 191 (1994). 
The Sentencing Reform Act embodies Congress’ rejection of traditional 
penal rehabilitationism. The Act: (1) abolishes parole and adopts a 
determinate ‘real time’ sentencing scheme; and (2) structures and narrows 
judicial sentencing discretion through the creation of a single administrative 
agency — the United States Sentencing Commission — empowered to 
promulgate presumptively binding sentencing guidelines. 
Id. 
 52. FREDERIQUE A. LAUBEPIN, PENAL SANCTIONING IN THE UNITED STATES: 
EXPLAINING CROSS-STATE DIFFERENCES 18 (2015) (“Under sentencing guidelines, 
each offense or offense class will have multiple sentencing recommendations based 
on the prior criminal history of the offender, and recommended prison terms are 
generally determined according to the severity of the offense committed and the 
prior criminal history of the offender.” (emphasis in orginal)). 
 53. Stanley A. Weigel, The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984: A Practical 
Appraisal, 36 UCLA L. REV. 83, 86 (1988). 
 54. Nagel & Johnson, supra note 51; see also Koons-Witt, supra note 10, at 300. 
 55. See SHANE-DUBOW ET AL., supra note 34, at 6. 
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movement, however, “prompted America’s reconsideration of its 
penal goals” nationwide.56 In response to the federal adoption of the 
determinate model, every state curtailed its previously indeterminate 
system through a variety of mechanisms, including “three-strikes” 
laws and the adoption of truth-in-sentencing laws.57 
C. The Impact of Sentencing Reform on Female Sentencing 
Outcomes 
The significance of gender in sentencing decisions has varied over 
time, with some recent data indicating that women no longer receive 
leniency based on gender, as they once did.  In the 1970s, research 
examining the impact of extralegal factors, such as gender, revealed 
that female offenders “receive[d] more favorable sentences than 
similarly situated male offenders.”58  This disparity in treatment was 
regarded by some as the result of paternalism.59  Proponents of the 
paternalistic theory assert that judges are more lenient towards 
women because they perceive women as “less threatening, dangerous 
and culpable” than men, and feel a “paternalistic desire to protect 
and aid women in times of need.”60  Metadata analysis suggests that 
the sentencing disparity between men and women was at its lowest in 
the 1980s during the transition to determinate sentencing.61  This 
transition was characterized by a push to eliminate judicial discretion; 
policymakers’ preference for “equal sentencing over special 
treatment of women offenders” effectively ended judicial 
consideration for “mitigating circumstances such as family 
obligations, and has translated into longer prison terms for women.”62 
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines were designed to be entirely 
neutral as to gender, and explicitly state that “sex is not relevant in 
the determination of a sentence.”63  Empirical investigations of the 
 
 56. Albert W. Alschuler, The Changing Purposes of Criminal Punishment: A 
Retrospective on the Last Century and Some Thoughts about the Next, 70 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 9 (2003). 
 57. Pfaff, supra note 4, at 242. Three-strikes laws require that offenders receive 
“dramatically increased” sentences following a third criminal conviction. Id. at 245. 
Truth-in-sentencing laws require that offenders serve a specific percentage of their 
sentences before they are eligible for release. Id. 
 58. Nagel & Johnson, supra note 51, at 185. 
 59. Bontrager et al., supra note 9, at 353 (emphasis in original). 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 365. 
 62. Id. at 350–51. 
 63. Raeder, supra note 1, at 906 (citing to U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5H1.10 (U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N 1992)). 
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relationship between determinate guidelines and sentencing 
outcomes for women have, however, produced inconsistent results.64  
Early research on determinate guidelines indicated that sentencing 
disparities between male and female offenders were disappearing, as 
sentence length and severity were increasing for women.65  Later 
studies conducted in the 1990s contradict earlier findings, with more 
than two-thirds of all estimates “reflecting less severe sentencing 
outcomes for female offenders.”66  Yet, the most recent empirical 
studies, based on data from 2000–2006, “clearly demonstrate that 
women no longer enjoy significantly shorter sentences, have lower 
odds of incarceration, or have better chances at a sentencing 
departure than their male counterparts.”67 
The above survey of studies is by no means exhaustive, but it 
reflects the outcome-based emphasis of much of the empirical testing 
on gender and sentencing.  While the inconsistent results across these 
studies may reflect empirical realities, it is also possible that such 
inconsistencies can be attributed, in part, to the unique 
methodological challenges involved when conducting empirical 
studies in the criminal justice context, such as “presence of 
appropriate controls, time frame of the study, and punishment 
outcome.”68  Nonetheless, Richard Bierschbach and Stephanos Bibas 
assert, and this Note argues, that the greatest weakness in this body of 
research is not, in fact, the inconsistent results.  Rather, most 
concerning is the way this research frames and operationalizes the 
 
 64. See Bontrager et al., supra note 9, at 351. 
 65. See Kay A. Knapp, Impact of the Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines on 
Sentencing Practices, 5 HAMLINE L. REV. 237, 243 (1982). 
 66. Bontrager et al., supra note 9, at 365. 
 67. See id. at 365–66. 
By 2006, the number of studies finding significant differences in 
incarceration for male and female offenders dropped to 50% and the 
number showing a departure advantage for female offenders declined to 
60%. Finally, sentence length differentials have declined sharply over time 
according to the analysis. In the 1980s, 83% of the estimates indicated that 
women received significantly shorter sentences than men, but that figure 
dropped to 40% between 2000 and 2006. 
Id.; Ann Martin Stacey & Cassia Spohn, Gender and the Social Costs of Sentencing: 
An Analysis of Sentences Imposed on Male and Female Offenders in Three U.S. 
District Courts, 11 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 43, 54–55 (citing to a study in Cassia Spohn, 
Gender and Sentencing of Drug Offenders: Is Chivalry Dead?, 9 CRIM. JUST. POL’Y. 
REV. 365 (1998), which tested for an interaction between gender and sentences 
imposed on drug offenders in Chicago, Illinois, finding that preferential treatment of 
female offenders was “confined to cases involving offenders without dependent 
children and to offenders without a prior conviction for a drug offense”). 
 68. Bontrager et al., supra note 9, at 364. 
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concept of equality in sentencing through outcome-oriented terms 
that “deflect attention from political, policy and structural choices.”69 
By referring to differences in sentencing outcomes as “disparities,” 
these studies “presuppose[] that equal outcomes are good and 
unequal outcomes are bad,” and thus the language of equality and 
disparity obscures the “more positive” ways that sentencing 
differences can be understood.70  To that end, this Note argues, it is 
not a consideration of disparities between male and female sentencing 
outcomes that is most valuable in the context of policy change and 
reform.  Instead, it is the consideration of whether female sentencing 
outcomes reflect just results when correlates of female crime and 
relative harm are taken into account.  By way of example, the 
following section discusses specific changes in sentencing policy, such 
as drastic changes in drug enforcement practices,71 which have 
“distinctly disadvantaged” women.72  While men, too, have been 
affected by sentencing reform, “it is clear that women have suffered 
disproportionately to the harm their drug behavior represents.”73 
i. The War on Drugs 
Drug offenses committed by women represent the largest source of 
the increase in women in prison.  This increase can be traced to 
sentencing policy changes, at both the state and national levels, that 
mandated incarceration for low-level drug offenses.74  Today, a higher 
 
 69. Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, What’s Wrong with Sentencing 
Equality?, 102 VA. L. REV. 1447, 1457 (2016). 
 70. Id. at 1451. 
 71. See infra Section I.C. 
 72. Barbara Bloom et al., Women Offenders and the Gendered Effects of Public 
Policy, 21 REV. POL’Y RES. 31, 38–39 (2004). 
Mandatory minimum sentencing for drug offenses has significantly 
increased the numbers of women in state and federal prisons. Between 1995 
and 1996, female drug arrests increased by 95% while male drug arrests 
increased by 55%. In 1979, approximately one in ten women in US prisons 
was serving a sentence for a drug conviction; in 1999, this figure was 
approximately one in three. 
Id. at 38. 
 73. Id. 
 74. See, e.g., NAT’L RES. CTR. ON JUSTICE INVOLVED WOMEN, FACT SHEET ON 
JUSTICE INVOLVED WOMEN IN 2016 (2016), https://cjinvolvedwomen.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/06/Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/FP9V-GS9F] (stating that 
between 1986 and 1999, the number of women who were incarcerated for drug-
related offenses in state facilities increased 888%. 
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proportion of incarcerated women than incarcerated men are serving 
sentences for drug-related offenses.75 
The “War on Drugs” was officially declared by President Nixon in 
1971, but the anti-drug agenda was escalated significantly during the 
Reagan Administration with the enactment of the Comprehensive 
Crime Control Act of 1984 (Crime Control Act).76  Referred to as 
“the most significant series of changes in the federal criminal justice 
system ever enacted at one time,” the Crime Control Act includes 
many chapters addressing specific crime-related concerns.77  Chapter 
II of the Act contains the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.78 
While these changes in law and policy increased the risk of arrest 
for both men and women, “there have been clear gendered impacts in 
practice” that have increased the probability of female incarceration, 
such as the fact that women are more likely to be involved in the low-
level offenses that are targeted by “broken windows” policing and 
drug law enforcement.79  In the 1990s, changes in law enforcement 
policies, significantly the shift towards “broken windows” policing, 
contributed to an increase in the arrests of women.80  These changes 
emphasized the need to control low-level offenses in order to prevent 
more serious crimes.81  At the same time as the risk of arrest for low-
level crimes began to increase, the enactment of new federal drug 
laws in the late 1980s both shifted the public opinion about the 
dangers of drug abuse and resulted in “historically unprecedented 
 
 75. See id.; see also E. ANN CARSON, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2016 (2018) (“A quarter (25%) of females serving time in 
state prison on December 31, 2015, had been convicted of a drug offense, compared 
to 14% of males . . . . More than half (56% or 6,300) of female federal prisoners were 
serving sentences for a drug offense, compared to 47% of males (75,600).”). 
 76. Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984). 
 77. Joseph E. diGenova & Constance L. Belfiore, An Overview of the 
Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 — The Prosecutor’s Perspective, 22 AM. 
CRIM. L. REV. 707, 707 (1985). 
 78. See supra Section I.B.ii. 
 79. The “broken windows” theory is the theory that shifting policing priorities 
toward minor offenses would, over time, have the effect of preventing more serious 
crime. ELIZABETH SWAVOLA ET AL., VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, OVERLOOKED: WOMEN 
AND JAILS IN AN ERA OF REFORM 6 (2016), 
https://www.vera.org/downloads/publications/overlooked-women-and-jails-report-
updated.pdf [https://perma.cc/K39A-MMUM]. The policing practices that stemmed 
from the broken windows theory “stressed responses to quality-of-life and other low-
level offenses — such as petty theft, disorderly conduct, public intoxication, loitering, 
or vagrancy.” Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
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rates of imprisonment for drug use and possession.”82  For example, 
between 1995 and 1996, women arrested for drug-related offenses 
increased by 95% while male drug-related arrests increased only 
55%.83 
ii. Mandatory Minimum Sentencing 
Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes require a judge to 
sentence an offender who has committed a specific crime to a 
specified minimum term of incarceration.84  While mandatory 
minimum laws have been implemented for many types of offenses,85 
such laws are particularly frequent for drug offenses.86  Some scholars 
assert such mandatory minimum statutes, when combined with the 
inflexible Sentencing Guidelines regime, “result in lengthy 
incarceration of such women whose actual role in drug cases is often 
quite limited.”87  Many women who are incarcerated for drug offenses 
often become involved in drug crime through an existing relationship 
with a male drug trafficker — perhaps a father, brother, boyfriend or 
husband — upon whom they are financially dependent or may fear.88  
Such women, referred to by some scholars as “women of 
circumstance,” are typically minimally involved with their partner or 
family member’s illegal drug activity, yet, upon arrest, they are 
commonly charged with conspiracy.89  Under federal conspiracy 
laws,90 a woman’s presence in the home may be used as circumstantial 
evidence of participation in a conspiracy — as a result, “merely 
 
 82. NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13, at 120. 
 83. Covington & Bloom, supra note 3, at 5. 
 84. See Shimica Gaskins, “Women of Circumstance” — The Effects of 
Mandatory Minimum Sentencing on Women Minimally Involved in Drug Crimes, 41 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1533, 1539–40 (2004). 
 85. Today, most convictions under statutes requiring mandatory minimum 
penalties relate to controlled substances, firearms, identity theft, and child sex 
offenses. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, OVERVIEW OF MANDATORY MINIMUM 
PENALTIES IN THE FEDERAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 11 (2017). 
 86. Id. at 11 (“In recent years, drug trafficking offenses have accounted for 
approximately two-thirds of the offenses carrying a mandatory minimum penalty, 
significantly higher than the next largest class of offenses.”). The Anti-Drug Abuse 
Act of 1986 established mandatory minimum penalties for many drug trafficking 
offenses, and in 1988 Congress further extended the reach of these mandatory 
penalties to drug trafficking conspiracies “thereby broadening the scope of 
mandatory minimum penalties to include virtually all offenders in drug trafficking 
organizations.” Id. 
 87. Raeder, supra note 1, at 907. 
 88. Gaskins, supra note 84, at 1533. 
 89. See id. at 1533, 1537. 
 90. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000). 
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permitting drugs in the home, answering the door, or answering the 
telephone could establish that the wife or girlfriend was a knowing 
member of the conspiracy.”91 
At sentencing, mandatory minimum statutes for drug conspiracies 
permit a judge to consider only the quantity of drugs and the size of 
the conspiracy in assigning a sentence — factors such as an offender’s 
individual role in the conspiracy are not accounted for.92  “Women of 
circumstance,” therefore, are often sentenced not as minor 
participants, but are held “accountable for the offense as if they were 
the principal conspirators.”93 
Mandatory minimum sentencing statutes present a clear example 
of a gender-neutral sentencing policy that results in sentencing 
outcomes for women that are disproportionate to the harm caused by 
their conduct.  As discussed in Section I.C, it is important to 
understand that differences in sentencing outcomes across gender are 
not always bad.  In fact, such differences are necessary where gender-
neutral policies, such as mandatory minimum laws, do not account for 
differences in culpability between major participants and minor 
ancillary players in a given crime. 
II. THE FUTURE OF REFORM: A PROPOSED FRAMEWORK FOR THE 
CREATION OF GENDER-SPECIFIC SENTENCING POLICIES 
This Note argues, first, that future reform efforts should specifically 
target the problem of female incarceration through changes to 
sentencing policy and, second, that such changes must account for the 
unique causes and consequences of female incarceration if they are to 
be successful.  To that end, this Part outlines a suggested framework 
of inquiry to be used by policymakers in the creation of gender-
responsive sentencing policies and reforms.  First, one must examine 
the scope of the problem, by determining the rate at which women 
are being incarcerated, and the nature of the problem, by reviewing 
the backgrounds and demographics of women who are incarcerated.94  
Next, in order to create policies that address the scope and the nature 
of the female incarceration, one must investigate the unique causal 
and correlative mechanisms by which it occurs.95  Finally, in the 
context of policy reform, one must evaluate the impact of existing 
 
 91. Gaskins, supra note 84, at 1538. 
 92. See id. at 1541. 
 93. Id. at 1541–42. 
 94. See infra Section II.A. 
 95. See infra Section II.B. 
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sentencing policies on female incarceration, in light of insights 
gleaned from the inquiry outlined above.96 
This Note argues that an evaluation of current criminal justice 
policies, when informed by an analysis of the scope, nature, and 
correlates of female criminal behavior, reveals that current sentencing 
policies must be a major focus of reform efforts due to the impact of 
such policies on the rising rate of female incarceration in America. 
A. The Scope and Nature of the Problem 
While mass incarceration has resulted in the imprisonment of 
substantially more men than women, the growth rate of incarceration 
for women has outpaced men by more than double since 1980.97  
From 1980 to 2016, the number of women who were incarcerated 
increased by more than 700%98 and the United States now has the 
highest incarceration rate for women of any country in the world.99 
The above data, which reveals a striking picture of the current state 
of female incarceration, raises the question of why — why does the 
United States have the highest female incarceration rate in the world?  
While there is no single answer to this important question, an 
investigation into who incarcerated women actually are, beyond just 
the numbers, is an appropriate place to start. 
Over 80% of women in jail are incarcerated for non-violent 
offenses.100  Moreover, many women are in jail for violating the terms 
of their parole or probation, not for committing a new crime.101  In 
2016, over half of female federal prisoners had been convicted of a 
drug offense, as compared to 47% of male federal prisoners.102  
Likewise, a quarter of women serving time in state prison in 2015 had 
 
 96. See infra Section II.C. 
 97. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, INCARCERATED WOMEN AND GIRLS 1 (2018), 
https://www.sentencingproject.org/publications/incarcerated-women-and-girls/ 
[https://perma.cc/2EWA-YGAA]; see also WENDY SAWYER, THE GENDER DIVIDE: 
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https://www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/women_overtime.html [https://perma.cc/Z34V-
QDKB] (“Nationwide, women’s state prison populations grew 834 over nearly 40 
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 98. NAT’L RES. CTR. ON JUSTICE INVOLVED WOMEN, supra note 74. 
 99. ALEKS KAJSTURA, STATES OF WOMEN’S INCARCERATION: THE GLOBAL 
CONTEXT 2018 PRISON POLICY INITIATIVE (2018), 
https://www.prisonpolicy.org/global/women/2018.html [https://perma.cc/4SU8-Y6SL]. 
 100. SWAVOLA ET AL., supra note 79, at 9. 
 101. See id. 
 102. E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2016 13 (2018), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p16.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/73SM-CLDK]. Drug offenses include trafficking and possession. Id. 
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been convicted of a drug offense, as compared to 14% of men in state 
prison.103 
Of critical importance is the fact that, according to 2014 figures, 
Black women are twice as likely to be incarcerated than White 
women.104  Women who become involved with the criminal justice 
system are disproportionately women of color and are often 
characterized as having a history of physical and sexual abuse, 
substance abuse, and poverty.105  Demographic data gathered in 2016 
supports this finding: six out of ten women in jail did not have full-
time employment prior to their arrest, and nearly 30% of incarcerated 
women had received public assistance, as compared to 8% of 
incarcerated men.106  Research reveals that women’s economic 
marginalization through precarious, low-paying jobs, is a contributing 
factor in a number of crimes frequently attributed to women, such as 
drug offenses.107  Additionally, almost 80% of women who are 
incarcerated in jails are mothers, the majority of whom are single 
mothers.108 
As many of these women experience poverty prior to incarceration 
and do not have household income from a spouse, they often do not 
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Quantitative Investigation of Women Probationers’ Paths to Incarceration, 36 CRIM. 
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 106. SWAVOLA ET AL., supra note 79, at 10. 
 107. See Amy Reckdenwald & Karen F. Parker, The Influence of Gender 
Inequality and Marginalization on Types of Female Offending, 12 HOMICIDE STUD. 
208, 211 (2008). Prior to the emergence of the crack cocaine in the 1980s, drug selling 
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CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 185, 203 (2004); SWAVOLA ET AL., supra note 79. 
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have means sufficient to support their children for the length of their 
detention or upon their release.109  As a result, the children of 
incarcerated single mothers are often placed in foster care.110  
Incarcerated mothers with children who entered the foster care 
system are half as likely to reunite with their children upon release, as 
compared to non-incarcerated mothers with children in foster care.111  
Separation, therefore, is a major source of stress for the majority of 
women who are incarcerated, as their detention exacerbates 
difficulties related to strained finances and limited support systems.112  
For example, common barriers to regular visitation by children 
include the children’s distance from the prison, lack of access to 
transportation, and “limited economic resources on the part of the 
caregiver.”113  Furthermore, when trying to regain custody of their 
children, mothers who are incarcerated may not have access to the 
resources often required to meet reunification requirements, such as 
parent education, drug treatment, counseling and vocational 
training.114  Research has found that, for women in prison, such 
parental stresses are linked to misconduct and reoffending upon 
release.115 
B. Connecting the Dots: Theories of Female Crime 
For the purposes of policy creation and reform, an understanding 
of the general backgrounds and demographics of women who are 
incarcerated is most useful when mapped against known causal and 
correlative mechanisms by which female criminal behavior occurs.  
As discussed in this Section, theories of female criminal behavior 
provide key insight into the unique reasons why women commit 
crime. 
In the context of criminal justice reform, the value of such insights 
cannot be understated.  As previously discussed in Section I.C, the 
rising rate of female incarceration has been correlated with major 
changes in policy that produced a largely gender-neutral approach to 
criminal punishment.  This “gender-neutral” approach does not, 
however, treat women and men equally, but rather treats women as if 
 
 109. Id. at 17. 
 110. Id. at 18. 
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 112. Id. at 17. 
 113. Barbara Bloom & Meda Chesney-Lind, Women in Prison: Vengeful Equity, 
in IT’S A CRIME: WOMEN AND JUSTICE 183, 188 (Rosylyn Muraskin ed., 2000). 
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 115. SWAVOLA ET AL., supra note 79, at 17. 
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they were men.116  Yet, in every category of crime, except for sex 
work, women offend at lower rates than men.117  The empirical reality 
of the divergence in male and female patterns of criminal offending 
— the so-called gender gap in crime — has led scholars to question 
whether female criminal behavior “can be explained by theories 
developed mainly by male criminologists to explain male crime.”118  
The study of female offenders has produced a number of gender-
specific theories that seek to explain the gender gap by identifying the 
root causes of female crime.119 
i. Pathways Perspective 
Much of the criminological scholarship that focuses on female 
offending does so through the “pathways” perspective, which 
investigates women’s distinct pathways to crime and recidivism as 
compared to men, and draws upon research detailing “the broad life 
disadvantages and social circumstances that put women at risk of 
ongoing criminal involvement, many of which are fundamentally 
gendered experiences.”120  Unlike traditional criminological research, 
which relies primarily on pre-sentence reports and official criminal 
justice records for data, studies premised on the pathways hypothesis 
collect and analyze interviews with women “to uncover the life events 
that place girls and women at risk of criminal offending.”121  This 
method of data collection allows scholars to “sequence the life events 
that shape women’s choices and behaviors” and place them at risk of 
criminal behavior.122  Such studies have produced evidence that a 
 
 116. Covington & Bloom, supra note 3, at 4 (“[W]omen offenders are being swept 
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 118. Id. at 464. 
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history of abuse, both physical and sexual, appears to be the “major 
root[] of subsequent delinquency, addiction, and criminality.”123 
ii. Economic Marginalization Theory 
The economic marginalization hypothesis posits that economic 
disadvantage is a substantial predictor of female crime.124  One study, 
which tested the influence of gender inequality and economic 
marginalization on female crime, suggests female offending continues 
to increase because women are increasingly economically 
marginalized.125  Specifically, the results of the study support the 
notion that women commit crimes out of economic necessity.126 
Proponents of the economic marginalization theory suggest that 
the “feminization of poverty,” not women’s liberation, is most 
relevant to women’s criminality.”127  The “feminization of poverty,” a 
term first introduced by Diana Pearce in 1978, describes the 
overrepresentation of women in poverty in the United States.128  
Pearce discusses the uniqueness of female poverty, noting that much 
of women’s poverty is due to two causes that are specific to women: 
“Women often must provide all or most of the support for their 
children, and they are disadvantaged in the labor market.”129 
Pearce further identifies disparities in public assistance as a key 
driver of the feminization of poverty, noting that women are 
underrepresented in beneficiaries of the “more generous, work-
related” social insurance benefits, but overrepresented among 
recipients of public assistance, a “far less generous, means-tested 
program.”130  The “masculine” social welfare programs are social 
insurance schemes, such as unemployment insurance and social 
security, primarily benefiting men as “rights bearers and rewarding 
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productive labor.”131  As low-income women are disproportionately 
represented in the “non-standard” workforce as “part-time, 
temporary or home workers,”132 they do not receive social insurance 
benefits such as unemployment insurance because “a significant 
employment and earnings history is necessary for eligibility” and few 
low-income women meet these qualifications.133  The “feminine” 
social welfare programs, such as cash assistance and food stamps, are 
less generous, “have a heavy surveillance component, and devalue 
reproductive labor.”134 
Further, since 1978, changes to the family structure, the economy, 
and public assistance have contributed to the feminization of 
poverty.135  With respect to demographic shifts in the family structure, 
factors such as rising divorce rates and an increase in children born to 
unmarried mothers are highly relevant.136  Marriage at later ages and 
increasing divorce rates have produced a “larger proportion of adult 
women living independently.”137  As a result, as women often earn 
less income than men, women are at a greater risk for poverty.138  For 
the same reason, and since women are more often the caregiver for 
dependent children, single mothers in particular are at risk of 
poverty.139 
iii. The Relational Theory of Female Development 
The relational theory addresses gender differences from the 
perspective of psychological development.140  While traditional 
psychological theories have “described individual development as 
being a progression from childlike dependence to mature 
independence,” relational theorists posit that this conception of 
development, which assumes that “separation is the route to 
maturity,” describes only the male experience.141  A woman’s 
psychological development, by contrast, is primarily motivated by 
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establishing connections, as “[f]emales develop a sense of self and 
self-worth when their actions arise out of, and lead back into, 
connections with others.”142 
A woman’s psychological development is hindered, however, by 
the presence of disconnections within interpersonal relationships.143  
Whereas a childhood environment characterized by “mutuality, 
empathy, and power with others” fosters growth, an environment of 
abuse — such as those experienced by most of the women in the 
correctional system — produces “disempowerment, confusion or lack 
of clarity, diminished self-worth, and a turning away from 
relationships.”144  A relational context is crucial to the creation of 
successful criminal justice policy, as such a context provides insight 
into “the reasons why women commit crimes, their motivations, the 
ways in which they change their behaviors, and their reintegration 
into the community.”145  Considering relational theory during the 
process of policy creation and reform may yield policies that address 
the roots of female criminality from a much earlier stage — for 
example, if a policy targets and prevents the childhood abuse 
prevalent among the demographics of women who are statistically 
more likely to be incarcerated, it may have the effect of reducing 
criminal behavior in such women at later stages in their lives.146 
C. The Impact of Equalization in Sentencing on Women 
Before existing sentencing policies can be reformed to address the 
rapidly rising rate of female incarceration, it is imperative that 
policymakers comprehend the full impact of existing policies on 
women who are involved in the criminal justice system.  Such a 
comprehension requires an awareness of the unique life 
circumstances and experiences shared by women who are 
incarcerated, as discussed in Section II.B, and the connections 
between these circumstances and experiences and criminal behavior.  
With this awareness, it becomes evident that the standardization of 
criminal punishment has yielded inequitable outcomes for female 
offenders. 
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There has been substantial debate regarding the “equalization”147 
approach, which emphasizes parity but applies a male standard, 
embodied in determinate sentencing, and questions raised as to 
whether gender-neutral policies do, in fact, result in equality for 
women.148  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines, for example, were 
designed to “reduce race and class disparities in sentencing males,” 
yet in implementation have resulted in a number of factors that are 
“integral to the lives of female offenders” being ignored.149  Myrna 
Raeder, a leading scholar on the role of gender in sentencing, posits 
that “ironically, the downplaying of family and community ties in 
order to ensure that indigent minority males were not disadvantaged 
in sentencing resulted in women being sentenced more harshly than 
previously.”150  Furthermore, scholars Kathleen Daly and Michael 
Tonry examined the potential consequences of the shift toward 
determinate sentences and argue that, because determinate 
sentencing guidelines are based on “past average sentences for men 
or on an average for men’s and women’s sentences,” the development 
of determinate sentencing grids “equalizes justice by increasing 
female prison terms to the equivalent of their male counterparts.”151  
As discomfort with the rigidity of the determinate regime mounts,152 
scholarly attention has begun to focus on the ways formal equality 
subjugates marginalized groups, including women.153  To that end, the 
next Section explains why the standardization of criminal punishment 
through gender-neutral policy creation does not, in fact, result in 
gender equality. 
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D. The Problem with Formal Equality 
The standardization of punishment is appealing on a number of 
levels.  The modern sentencing system assigns punishment based only 
on the crime committed and the offender’s criminal history, thus 
bypassing contentious moral debates over “the purposes of 
punishment or what makes offenders alike or different in meaningful 
ways.”154  This simplification, however, results in important 
sentencing questions, such as “what factors make cases relevantly 
alike, who should measure them against which purposes of 
punishment, and how to resolve conflicts among those purposes,” 
being entirely overlooked.155 
In the context of sentencing, equality presumably means “treating 
like cases alike.”156  Under the current approach to sentencing, 
“equality” is created by standardizing the number of years in prison 
assigned for each crime.  This conception of equality, however, 
“focuses not on equal inputs or fair processes but on uniform 
outputs.”157  The formulation of fairness that characterizes the 
modern sentencing system largely reduces equality to mere 
mathematics.  As the only permissible inputs are the type of crime 
committed and the offender’s criminal history, the output does not 
account for many important factors that make cases relevantly similar 
or different, such as culpability.158  The equality deficiencies in the 
modern system become particularly clear when considered in the 
context of mandatory minimum sentences: 
Mandatory minimum penalties, for instance, might eliminate 
disparities and achieve formal equality of punishments among 
offenders convicted of the same crime. But virtually no one would 
contend that they achieve individualized justice: The big fish deserve 
more punishment than the medium and small fry, even if they all 
violated the same statute.159 
As gender is not a permissible input, this approach similarly fails to 
account for the differences between male and female offenders 
relevant to establishing culpability and resulting harm.160 
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E. The Individualized Approach: Gender-Responsive Policies 
A review of the backgrounds of female offenders makes clear that 
there are better ways to address and prevent women’s criminality 
than are presently in use, such as adopting gender-responsive policies 
to improve the management and treatment of women in the criminal 
justice system.161  Support for gender-responsive criminal justice 
policies can be found in the scholarship of gender difference theory 
and critical criminology.  These schools of thought establish 
justifications for gender-responsiveness that are neither based on 
traditional female gender roles in society nor on recidivism statistics, 
but rather on the impact of structural inequality on female identity 
and behavior.162 
Addressing the realities of women’s lives through gender-
responsive policies is “fundamental” to improved outcomes at all 
phases of the correctional system — policies that are responsive to the 
unique issues facing female offenders will be “more effective” in 
intervening in the pathways to crime that “both propels and returns 
women into the criminal justice system.”163  For example, a focus on 
women’s lived experiences when formulating strategies for crime 
prevention would draw attention to the connections among crime, 
violence, substance abuse, and trauma that increase a woman’s risk of 
incarceration.164  Furthermore, the pathways and relational 
explanations discussed in Section II.C offer precise targets for 
criminal justice intervention.165 The following sections provide 
theoretical support for individualization and gender-responsiveness. 
i. Gender Difference Theory 
Gender difference theory is premised on the assertion that there 
are “behavioral, social, cultural and psychological differences” 
between men and women, and thus, in many contexts, equal 
treatment of men and women does not result in true equality for 
women.166  Gender-based differences in treatment, experience, and 
expectation, it is argued, “correlate with different modes of thinking, 
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acting, interrelating, and interpreting reality.”167  Under this theory, 
gender is not understood as an individual characteristic, but rather as 
a “social organizing principle” that sorts people into two “separate 
but unequal” groups.168  Generally speaking, difference theorists aim 
to amplify the voices and stories of women, “who traditionally have 
been excluded, subordinated and marginalized in the power 
structures of society” within the patriarchal social order.169  Gender 
difference theory is particularly powerful tool in the legal context — 
by providing insights into “gender bias, marginality and exclusion,” 
gender difference may inform a restructuring of the role of the law in 
perpetuating “hierarchy and domination.”170 
ii. Critical Criminology 
Broadly speaking, criminology is defined as the “systematic study 
of the nature, extent, cause, and control of law-breaking behavior.”171  
Classical criminology is premised on the belief that, because people 
are rational and freethinking, individuals are “free to choose crime as 
one of a range of behavioral options.”172  The classical theory, 
therefore, does not account for impact of structural inequality on 
criminal behavior.173  More recent schools of thought, collectively 
termed “critical” criminologies, analyze crime from a “wider, more 
holistic and globally aware perspective.”174  These theoretical 
frameworks center on the belief that “humans create cultural 
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solutions to their life problems in social structures which are largely 
not of their own making.”175  In contrast to classical criminology, 
critical theories do not assume the decision to engage in criminal 
behavior is one that an individual makes rationally, but rather look 
for the causes of crime “in the system and social structure of 
society.”176  The aim of critical criminology, then, is to dissect the 
power relations involved in the law and the fairness of the current 
social order to identify solutions that “promote justice rather than 
simply repress criminals.”177 
Feminist criminology is a school of thought falling under the 
critical criminology umbrella.  The key feature of feminist 
criminology distinguishing it from mainstream criminology is its 
conception of the nature of gender.178  Broadly speaking, feminist 
criminologists view gender relations as “fundamental organizers” of 
our society’s social structure.179  Social constructs of gender, such as 
masculinity and femininity, are based on “assumptions that men are 
superior to women,” which are then reflected in our social, economic, 
and political structures.180 
Feminist criminology developed largely in response to a perceived 
defect in mainstream criminological theory — gender blindness.181  
Traditional approaches to the study of crime largely ignored the role 
played by women, instead “focusing exclusively or implicitly on 
explaining male participation in crime.”182  Mainstream theories of 
crime causation are, therefore, grounded in male models of behavior, 
and “cannot adequately explain the experiences of delinquent girls or 
criminal women.”183 
The framework of inquiry presented in this Part, supported by the 
theories of critical criminology and gender difference theory 
 
 175. GREGG BARAK ET AL., CLASS, RACE, GENDER & CRIME: THE SOCIAL 
REALITIES OF JUSTICE IN AMERICA 43 (Sarah Stanton & Carli Hansen eds., 5th ed. 
2018). 
 176. LANIER ET AL., supra note 171, at 297–98 (“[A]ny analysis of crime causation 
needs also to ‘consider how offenders have themselves been ‘victimized,’ first by 
society, and subsequently by the criminal justice system through its selective 
processing of the powerless.’”). 
 177. BARAK ET AL., supra note 175, at 46. 
 178. See LANIER ET AL., supra note 171, at 274. 
 179. See id. at 275. 
 180. Id. 
 181. See id. at 276. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Emily Gaarder & Joanne Belknap, Tenuous Borders: Girls Transferred to 
Adult Court, 40 CRIMINOLOGY 481, 483 (2002). 
2020] INJUSTICE OF FORMAL GENDER EQUALITY IN SENTENCING 423 
presented above, provides a structure within which policymakers can 
grapple with the rising rate of female incarceration and its 
consequences.  Part III of this Note shifts away from theory in favor 
of action and discusses specific policy changes that embody the 
framework discussed above. 
III. GENDER-RESPONSIVE SENTENCING POLICIES IN PRACTICE 
While Part II of this Note outlines a suggested framework of 
analysis for policymakers to consult in the process of creating gender-
responsive sentencing policies, this Part identifies two policies, risk 
assessment instruments and gender-responsive diversion 
programming, that exemplify the proper application of this 
framework. 
Although the goal of eliminating gender bias in sentencing is an 
important one, it cannot be achieved “simply by legislating gender 
neutrality in sentencing.”184  Just as it is accepted that differences in 
male and female physiology “have consequences in such contexts as 
pregnancy, health, strength, and longevity,” so too must the 
“gendered nature of crime and familial relationships” be accepted 
and considered legitimate sentencing factors.185  The following Part 
provides examples of powerful, realistic gender-responsive policies 
that are compatible with the theories of crime discussed in Part II. 
A. Risk Assessment Instruments 
Under the indeterminate sentencing regime discussed in Section 
I.B, assessments of an individual offender’s risk of committing future 
crime were an essential component of criminal sanctioning.186  The 
purpose of such risk assessments is to predict which individuals are at 
a high risk of committing future crime and, in turn, “to use that 
information to determine who should go to prison and who can safely 
be released.”187  While sentencing based on risk assessments fell out 
of favor during the shift to the determinate model in the 1970s, the 
last decade has seen a resurgence in the incorporation of risk 
assessment in criminal sanctioning.188 
 
 184. Raeder, supra note 1, at 921. 
 185. Id. 
 186. See John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Redux: The Resurgence of 
Risk Assessment in Criminal Sanctioning, 26 FED. SENT’G REP. 158, 158 (2014). 
 187. Rebecca Foxwell, Risk Assessment and Gender for Smarter Sentencing, 3 VA. 
J. CRIM. L. 435, 441 (2015). 
 188. See Monahan & Skeem, supra note 186, at 158. 
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The resurgence of risk assessments in sentencing can likely be 
attributed to fiscal concerns: “The fiscal condition of most American 
jurisdictions is so dire that maintaining what is by international 
standards an absurdly bloated prison population is simply not a 
sustainable option.”189  Risk assessment instruments, in theory, divert 
those who are at low-risk of recidivating away from incarceration and 
into alternative punishments or treatments, thus reducing prison 
populations and expenses.190  Four states in particular — California, 
Utah, Pennsylvania, and Virginia — have established detailed risk 
assessment mechanisms that inform judges of an individual’s 
“statistical risk of recidivating” at the time of sentencing.191  These 
mechanisms assess a variety of “risk factors,” which are factors that 
are correlated with crime and precedes it in time.192  Risk factors 
commonly assessed include age, gender, number of prior arrests, and 
mental health.193 
As it has been argued that the use of group data to predict 
individual risk based on gender may be unconstitutional,194 the below 
paragraphs provide an overview of this scholarly debate.  A 
constitutional challenge to risk assessment classifications based on 
gender are likely to be brought under the Equal Protection Clause.195  
Under the Equal Protection Clause, certain classifications — 
including race, ethnicity, and religious beliefs — have been identified 
as “suspect classes” and are generally prohibited.196  Classifications 
based on sex, on the other hand, may be permitted where such a 
classification serves a “substantial” state interest.197  In her article, 
Evidence-Based Sentencing and the Scientific Rationalization of 
Discrimination, Sonja Starr asserts that the use of gender 
classifications to inform individual sentencing decisions is likely 
unconstitutional because it impermissibly discriminates based on 
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“statistical generalizations.”198  Scholar Rachel Foxwell, however, 
argues that the evidence upon which Starr relies to support her claim 
is questionable.199 
For instance, Starr cites Craig v. Boren, in which the Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional a law making the legal drinking age 
higher for men than for women, in support of her proposition that it is 
unconstitutional to infer an individual tendency from group 
statistics.200  According to Foxwell, the Court held only that the 
specific statistical evidence presented in this case was insufficient to 
justify the law, not that inferences based on group statistics were 
prohibited in all cases.201  In comparison, the body of statistical 
evidence behind gender and crime, particularly gender and 
recidivism, is “robust and well understood.”202 
The Supreme Court in United States v. Virginia announced an 
intermediate level of scrutiny for equal protection challenges to 
classifications based on gender.203  To survive an equal protection 
challenge, the justification for the gender-based classification must be 
“exceedingly persuasive,” and the state must show both that the 
classification serves “important governmental objectives,” and that 
the means employed are “substantially related to the achievement of 
those objectives.”204  Finally, the reason for the classification cannot 
be based on “archaic and overbroad generalization about gender” or 
“outdated misconceptions.”205  According to Foxwell, “given the 
strength of the data on gender and crime — as well as the importance 
of the government’s interest in preventing crime — it appears that the 
use of gender in sentencing risk assessments would pass a 
constitutional challenge under the Equal Protection Clause.”206  
Other scholars, such as John Monahan, agree that gender as a risk 
factor should have “little difficulty” surviving an Equal Protection 
challenge.207 
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Despite the strength of the argument that gender-specific risk 
assessment instruments would survive an equal protection challenge, 
the application of such risk assessments may not sufficiently address 
the correlates of female criminality.  While the use of risk assessment 
instruments may reduce individual sentences for female offenders, it 
does not serve the greater purposes of rehabilitation.  In the 
alternative, as discussed below, gender-responsive diversion 
programming both addresses the correlates of female criminality and 
serves the greater purposes of rehabilitation. 
B. Diversion Programming and Alternatives to Incarceration 
This Note argues that alternatives to incarceration (ATI) 
programs, also referred to as criminal justice diversion programs, 
represent another sentencing policy that is responsive to the unique 
life circumstances and experiences of women, in accordance with the 
framework presented in Part II.  Broadly speaking, post-conviction 
ATI or diversion programs aim to place an individual who is facing 
incarceration on a justice track that is “less restrictive and affords 
more opportunities for rehabilitation and restoration.”208  Such 
programs often include the use of the court’s authority to provide 
“behavioral health care and other services” in lieu of incarceration.209 
The implementation of ATI “began in the 1980s in response to the 
emerging recognition that prison populations were growing out of 
control.”210  Over time, ATI programs came to include rehabilitation-
oriented programming such as drug treatment, new methods of 
accountability such as community service, and new methods of 
supervision such as home confinement and electronic monitoring.211  
A nation-wide survey of criminal justice diversion programs and 
initiatives conducted in 2013 identified a diversity of existing 
programs, ranging from “statewide statutes affecting thousands to 
problem-solving courts serving dozens.”212  In light of this Note’s 
focus on sentencing policies, this Section will discuss diversion 
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programming targeted at the post-conviction phase of criminal justice 
administration.213 
This Section focuses on the ATI system in New York City for two 
reasons.  First, ATI programs in New York City are uniquely well-
funded214 and have been the subject of research and evaluation that 
document the process of implementation and find that New York 
City’s ATI programs are effective in “reducing recidivism and 
achieving prison displacement.”215  Second, the ATI system in New 
York City differs from other ATI systems nationwide in the structure 
of its gender-responsive programs.216  Each ATI program in New 
York City that serves felony defendants is under contract to treat 
either a general population of offenders or “one of three special 
populations — substance abusers, women, or youth.”217 
The Center for Alternative Sentencing and Employment Services 
(CASES) is one example of a program that is under contract to 
specifically treat women offenders.  CASES provides female 
offenders with a history of frequent low-level criminal involvement 
who are facing charges or have been convicted in New York County 
Criminal Court with gender-responsive ATI programming.218  This 
program, Women’s Diversion Services, provides services designed to 
address “past trauma and reduce behaviors associated with criminal 
activity” through supportive counseling, psychiatric services, 
mentoring, and referrals to address immediate needs.219 
In their counseling services, CASES provides trauma-informed 
care with sessions that address “asking for help, setting boundaries in 
relationships, engaging others in supporting one’s recovery, self-care, 
and coping with triggers associated with negative behaviors, including 
substance abuse.”220  Through mentoring services, the program 
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provides training to help female offenders develop skills to approach 
everyday activities such as “navigating public agencies, applying for 
entitlements, asking for help, and accessing community resources.”221  
CASES also provides referrals tailored to each individual woman’s 
needs and goals, including referrals to “job training, adult education, 
medical care, leisure and recreation services, mental health treatment, 
drug treatment, bereavement services, legal assistance, domestic 
violence services, and/or child welfare preventive services.”222 
The CASES program, this Note argues, is a prime example of a 
sentencing policy that accounts for and responds to the scope and 
nature of female incarceration, the correlates of female criminal 
behavior, and the impact of existing policies on women who are 
involved in the criminal justice system.  First, the rising rate of female 
incarceration in New York State closely mimics that of the nation.223  
Second, the nature of female incarceration in New York State, that is, 
the demographics of women who are incarcerated, is similar to that of 
the country at large.224  Third, the CASES program is designed to 
address the correlates of female criminality.225  For example, the 
counseling services provided by CASES incorporate the pathways 
perspective.226 through trauma-informed care that helps individual 
women identify and address the life events that may have led to 
criminal behavior.227  Further, by providing referrals to job training 
and adult education, CASES interrupts the cycle of economic 
marginalization for female offenders.228  The CASES program also 
provides services that address the relational theory of female 
development: mentoring services offer female offenders an 
opportunity to establish connections and learn how to take advantage 
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of community resources.229  Finally, programs like CASES provide 
meaningful alternatives to existing sentencing policy that embrace 
differences in sentencing outcomes and promote rehabilitation as 
opposed to demanding equalization and promoting incapacitation.230 
CONCLUSION 
Dynamism is an inherent and important quality of the criminal 
justice system, and thus changes in the philosophical foundations of 
the system are to be expected over time.  The nationwide rejection of 
the indeterminate sentencing model, however, is a shift of particular 
consequence.  The departure from the rehabilitative model at both 
the state and federal level was not merely a reflection of oscillating  
political ideologies, but rather signaled a “deeper change in 
conception — discourse, objectives, and techniques — in the penal 
process.”231  With this change, a foundational premise of the 
American criminal law, the focus on “intention in order to assign 
guilt,”232 has given way to a system concerned primarily with 
“techniques to identify, classify, and manage groups” sorted by 
perceived dangerousness, and the deployment of control over 
offenders in the aggregate in place of “traditional techniques for 
individualizing or creating equity.”233 
In 1970, former U.S. Attorney General Ramsey Clark wrote that, 
regarding the purpose of punishment in the American criminal justice 
system: 
Rehabilitation is individual salvation.  What achievement can give 
society greater satisfaction than to afford the offender the chance, 
once lost, to live at peace, to fulfill himself and to help others?  
Rehabilitation is also the one clear way that criminal justice 
processes can significantly reduce crime.234 
This statement, when considered in the context of recent calls for 
criminal justice reform in both the political and cultural spheres, is 
striking for its compassion toward criminal offenders.  Arguably, the 
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indeterminate sentencing model of the 1950s, with its rehabilitative 
underpinnings and focus on individuality, embodied many of the 
principles that the modern reform movement demands.  A mere 
return to the indeterminate model, however, would be insufficient to 
address the need for substantive equality in sentencing. 
The determinate model that has dominated the criminal justice 
system for the past two decades has led to, among other 
consequences, an unprecedented rise in female incarceration, which 
calls for urgent reform.  As, for now, the numerical population of 
women who are incarcerated remains much smaller than that of men, 
there is still an opportunity for realistic and attainable course 
correction.  Although this Note focuses on gender-responsiveness in 
the sentencing context, similar reform efforts are needed at all stages 
of the pre-incarceration process for criminal justice-involved women, 
particularly in the arrest and bail processes.  If we are to stop the dark 
history and ongoing crisis of male mass incarceration from repeating 
itself, it is critical that substantive equality be established for female 
offenders through gender-responsive policy reforms. 
